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Introduction 
When I say to you that now is the time to act, it is because you can readily see that 
 mob violence has overridden statutes and constitutional law in our country. Rights 
 and justice in the South and far West have been obliterated by mob law and 
 condoned by governors and other state and county officials. I think the time has now 
 arrived, Mr. President, that you should invoke the power invested in you as the chief 
 magistrate of this great nation of ours and stamp out lynching and mob law forever.1 
During the 1930s, President Roosevelt received many letters resembling the one above. He 
was asked to condemn lynchings and support federal anti-lynching legislation. The debate 
about such legislation was not a new phenomenon, however, never before was it as intense 
or emotionally charged as during the New Deal era.     
 Most of the lynching victims were from African American decent. Therefore, the 
debate was inevitably fueled by racism and discrimination. In the decades before, the 
number of lynchings had steadily declined. However, when the Great Depression hit, they 
began to increase again. While many states did have their own anti-lynching laws, they were 
almost never enforced. Thus, the question of federal legislation came up again. In Congress 
there were two main camps, those who were in favor of such a law and those who were 
against it. Most of the opponents came from southern states. Uncoincidentally, most of the 
lynchings occurred in the South where racial tensions were without parallel.2   
 Many of its proponents in Congress came from the Northern States. However, 
outside of Congress, there were many people in both the North and the South who wanted 
to eradicate the evil. This thesis will focus on two of them: Walter White and Mary McLeod 
Bethune. They make for an interesting case-study, since they worked from quite different 
perspectives. White was the executive secretary of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)3 and Bethune was the unofficial leader of 
Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet and the director of the National Youth Administration (NYA).4 
                                                          
1 S. F. Holman to President F. D. Roosevelt (4 December 1933) in: G. McJimsey, ed., Documentary History of the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Volume 11: FDR and Protection from Lynching, 1934-1945 (London 2003) 19. 
2 M. Park, ‘Lynching and Antilynching: Art and Politic in the 1930s’, Prospects, Volume 18 (October 1993) 312. 
3 ‘Walter White’, Encyclopedia Brittanica (online version 2018) https://www.britannica.com/biography/Walter -
White-American-civil-rights-activist (13-03-2018). 
4 G. Jaynes, ‘Mary McLeod Bethune’, in: G. Jaynes et al., Encyclopedia of African-American Society (Thousand 
Oaks 2005) 99. 
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While White was primarily an activist who devoted his career to the improvement of the 
lives of African Americans, Bethune was a government official whose main concern was the 
education of the black community. Despite their different strategies, however, both hoped 
to see federal anti-lynching legislation pass and worked towards the same goal.  
 When the anti-lynching bills were pending in Congress, they organized conferences, 
meetings and wrote letters to state-officials, congressmen and, most importantly, to the 
president of the United States. When the bills were threatened by filibusters organized by 
Southern senators, they believed that the only way to ensure their passage was to gain the 
support of Roosevelt. If the President would strongly speak out in favor of federal legislation, 
the filibusterers were most likely to give in.5 Therefore, this thesis will focus on the following 
research question: “How did Walter White and Mary McLeod Bethune differ in their 
attempts to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt to endorse anti-lynching legislation in the 1930s 
and to what extent were they successful?”        
 While much has been written about lynchings, many publications focus more on the 
horrors themselves than they do on anti-lynching legislation. Especially the role Roosevelt 
played in the debate is often ignored. R. L. Zangrando, however, devoted multiple chapters 
in his book The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 to the reaction of the Roosevelt 
administration to federal legislation. As the title promises, the book provides a detailed 
history of the NAACP and its struggle to enact an anti-lynching law. He argued that ‘the 
Association played a singularly important role in redirecting public attitudes and policies 
toward Afro-Americans.’6 The book focuses primarily on Walter White, since he was the 
executive secretary of the Association and its principal spokesman against lynchings.  
 While Zangrando, and most other writers focus on lynchings as an American 
phenomenon, it is important to note that they have occurred throughout history. M. Berg 
and S. Wendt argued that lynchings did not originate in the United States, nor were they all 
racist acts of violence. In their book, Globalizing Lynching History: Vigilantism and Extralegal 
Punishment from an International Perspective, they argue that vigilantism was in fact not a 
new concept by the 19th century. They state that even though the term might have been 
coined and popularized by Americans, ‘they certainly had no monopoly on the practice.’7 
                                                          
5 R. L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 (Philadelphia 1980) 131. 
6 Ibidem, 213.  
7 M. Berg and S. Wendt, Globalizing Lynching History: Vigilantism and Extralegal Punishment from an 
International Perspective (New York 2011) 2. 
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Before the Civil War lynchings were already occurring all over the world. Throughout the 
centuries, people would take law and order into their own hands, when they no longer 
trusted their governments’ judgement. At first, both blacks and whites fell victim to vigilante 
justice. It was only after the reconstruction era had ended, that the lynchings began to focus 
on one specific minority.8         
 From that point onwards, lynchings became primarily known as American racist 
occurrences. It remains remarkable that they could occur in a nation known for its high 
standards of morality, freedom and democracy. D. Kato, author of Liberalizing Lynching: 
Building a New Racialized State, sought to explain this paradoxical relationship between the 
liberal regime and the illiberal act of lynching.9 His book does not focus on what the 
government did against lynchings; instead it highlights how the government publicly 
explained why it did not do anything in order to prevent the horrors.10 He stated that it was 
a matter of “Constitutional Anarchy”, which refers to: 
a relatively stable arrangement of control that was predicated on how the 3 federal 
 branches of government handled issues that each dreaded publicly, but approved of 
 privately, thereby allowing the federal government the means by which it could 
 deflect accountability while retaining authority. It situates negligence in a manner 
 that operates squarely within the very ways federal powers are separated.11 
Kato argued that the government had not stripped itself from the authority to intervene; 
instead, its officials chose not to act. The federal government actively decided ‘to comply 
with Southern racism, thereby raising questions regarding complicity.’12   
 Thus, Kato believed that if they really wanted to stop the lynchings, all three 
branches of the federal government could have ended it all along. I. Katznelson also argued 
that the United States provided the world with an ‘example of a liberal democracy 
successfully experimenting and resisting radical tyranny.’13 Still, it was unable ‘to remain 
unaffected by its associations with totalitarian governments or domestic racism.’14 However, 
                                                          
8 Ibidem, 1-6. 
9 D. Kato, Liberalizing Lynching, Building a New Racialized State (New York 2015) 8. 
10 Ibidem, 14.  
11 Ibidem, 3. 
12 Ibidem, 6. 
13 I. Katznelson, Fear itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York 2013) 9. 
14 Ibidem. 
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his book Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time does not share Kato’s opinion 
about the government and overall Katznelson is rather positive about Roosevelt and his New 
Deal. Still, he did argue that Americans lived in fear of change, especially during the Great 
Depression.15 ‘A climate of universal fear deeply affected political understandings and 
concerns. Nothing was sure.’16 According to the author, lynchings were one of the 
expressions of those fears, since the racial structure of the South was both a worry for its 
adversaries and its defenders.17 However, it was not just a Southern problem. Throughout 
the country, many citizens looked the other way when racist violence proceeded.18  
 Still, not all Americans remained silent. There were many who became actively 
involved with the issue and did everything they could to ensure the enactment of anti-
lynching legislation. Among them, of course, were White and Bethune. There are some 
publications devoted to White’s career in the NAACP and his efforts to eradicate the 
lynching evil, like the beforementioned book of Zangrando. However, White wrote an 
autobiography as well, A Man Called White. In the book, he describes his own efforts in favor 
of legislation and even mentions the conversations he had with both the President and the 
First Lady. However, much less has been written about Bethune’s anti-lynching efforts. Most 
of the publications about her focus primarily on her role as a government official and the 
part she played in favor of the education of African Americans. The book Mary McLeod 
Bethune in Washington, D.C., for instance, stated that:  
 Once in a century, a person comes along who will change the way everyone views the 
 world while simultaneously fueling worldwide social movements. Passionately 
 committed to all methods of social reform, Mary McLeod Bethune created 
 institutions that improved the daily lives of people on the local, regional, national and 
 international levels. This study seamlessly fuses together the life of Mary McLeod 
 Bethune while creating a new base for appreciating the life of a remarkable activist 
 and agent of change.19 
                                                          
15 Ibidem, 8. 
16 Ibidem, 11. 
17 Ibidem, 14. 
18 Ibidem, 14. 
19 E. Clark-Lewis, ‘Foreword’, in: I. E. Jones, Mary McLeod Bethune in Washington D.C. (Charleston 2013) 7. 
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 However, there are some articles that include Bethune’s work as an activist in favor 
of anti-lynching legislation. Among them is the work of J. Jack and L. Massagee: ‘Ladies and 
Lynching: Southern Women, Civil Rights, and the Rhetoric of Interracial Cooperation.’20 The 
publication focuses on multiple women, including Bethune, who acted against lynchings. It 
describes Bethune’s efforts within the Women’s Committee of the Commission on 
Interracial Cooperation (CIC) to unite both black and white women in the South against 
lynchings. They wanted ‘to lift the veil of ignorance that has shrouded white Southerners in 
hatred and black Southerners in fear.’21 However, Bethune had to work with less than ideal 
situations. For instance, most Southern white women wanted to work from within a 
segregated organization which educated people about lynchings instead of becoming 
involved with federal legislation.22 While the article provides an interesting view of 
Bethune’s activities as president of the Women’s Committee, it only mentions one or two of 
her efforts in the anti-lynching debate and its main focus remains the overall work of 
Southern women against lynchings.        
 This thesis differs from the beforementioned publications because it compares both 
White and Bethune’s efforts in the anti-lynching debate. While some of the authors do not 
focus on either of them, others merely focus on the government’s failure to support and 
enact anti-lynching legislation. They only briefly mention the bills’ supporters who worked 
on both regional and national levels in order to ensure the enactment of such legislation. 
The publications that do focus on either White or Bethune, barely mention the other. Even 
in his autobiography White mentions Bethune only once or twice. While he does recall his 
own anti-lynching efforts, he fails to mention Bethune’s.23 Zangrando’s work provides 
another example. He elaborated extensively on White’s struggle to ensure the enactment of 
a federal law against lynchings, but only briefly mentioned Bethune’s work in the same field. 
He only wrote about the two of them working together during the 1940s and completely 
ignored Bethune’s efforts to eradicate lynchings in the previous decades.24   
 Another aspect that has often been overlooked is the influence anti-lynching activists 
                                                          
20 J. Jack and L. Massagee, ‘Ladies and Lynching: Southern Women, Civil Rights, and the Rhetoric of Interracial 
Cooperation’, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, Volume 14, Number 3 (Fall 2011) 493-510. 
21 Ibidem, 494. 
22 Ibidem, 506. 
23 W. White, A man called White, the Autobiography of Walter White (Athens 1948) 174. 
24 Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade, 169-171. 
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and government officials had on the President. Kato, for instance, mentioned that all 
branches of the government were responsible for the failure to pass an anti-lynching law.25 
He stated that: ‘Federal actions against lynching were a hot potato everybody was trying to 
pass.’26 While, he criticized all three of the branches and focused on them individually, he 
did not elaborate on any specific administration’s failure to support federal legislation nor 
did he focus on the people who tried to gain the President’s support. This thesis, on the 
other hand, does focus on the Roosevelt administration’s efforts in the anti-lynching debate 
and on the influence Walter White and Mary McLeod Bethune had on the President. 
 While the publications about both White and Bethune’s work in favor of anti-lynching 
legislation are limited, there are many primary sources available. Both have written multiple 
letters to the President, his wife, congressmen, other politicians and to each other. Many of 
these sources are bundled in G. McJimsey’s Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidency, Volume 11: FDR and Protection from Lynching, 1934-1945 and in The Eleanor 
Roosevelt Papers and The Mary McLeod Bethune Papers at the Roosevelt Institute for 
American Studies in Middelburg. Moreover, there are many newspaper articles which 
describe in great detail the occurrences surrounding anti-lynching legislation throughout the 
1930s.            
 The Fact that these highly influential anti-lynching crusaders have never been 
compared to each other on this topic before makes for an interesting endeavor. Both of 
them were African American activists and both knew Roosevelt and his wife on a somewhat 
personal level. The main difference between them, however, was the position they held in 
the debate. While Bethune worked from within the federal government, White had to work 
around it. He remained a loyal lobbyist, who often sought the help of liberal politicians.27 
The comparison between the two of them is not just interesting, it is an important addition 
to the debate as well. While they were not alone in their crusade against lynchings, they 
could be considered as its front runners.      
 Therefore, this thesis is dedicated to their work in the debate about federal anti-
lynching legislation. It is divided into four chapters. The first chapter entails a brief history of 
lynching and anti-lynching legislation. It focuses on the state laws against lynchings as well as 
                                                          
25 Kato, Liberalizing Lynching, 23.  
26 Ibidem, 60. 
27 Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade, 101. 
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on the three federal bills which were able to reach the Senate floor. The following questions 
will be answered: Why did the anti-lynching debate first come up in 1918 and later in 1934? 
How did state and federal legislators attempt to stop the lynchings and to what extent were 
their efforts successful?          
 The second chapter primarily focuses on Roosevelt’s role in the debate. During the 
progressive New Deal era, many African Americans hoped that their situation would be 
improved. Indeed, Roosevelt did create a Black Cabinet with multiple African American 
advisors and government officials.28 Furthermore, the First Lady played an important role in 
the debate about equality and racism as well, and she became involved with many different 
organizations. Thus, this chapter will focus on the following questions: What was the First 
Lady’s role in the debate? What were the President’s views on lynchings and anti-lynching 
legislation? What did he do in order to end the lynchings and why did he do so?  
 The third chapter is dedicated to Walter White and the role he played within the 
NAACP. He became the executive secretary at the beginning of the decade. From that time 
onwards, his main concern was the enactment of federal anti-lynching legislation.29 He knew 
that the only possibility to overcome the filibusters was to convince the President to take a 
stand in favor of the law.30 Therefore, the following questions will be discussed in this 
chapter: To what extent was White able to convince the President to endorse anti-lynching 
legislation? What did he do to make the enactment of both the Costigan-Wagner and the 
Gavagan bills a possibility? What was his role in the debate and what did he eventually 
achieve?           
 Finally, the fourth chapter is devoted to Mary McLeod Bethune, the Black Cabinet 
and the National Youth Administration. As the first African American women to head a 
federal agency, namely the NYA, Bethune was an inspiration to many others.31 She was part 
of countless activist groups and a true innovator. She organized many conferences to discuss 
problems confronting the black community and the topic of lynchings was one of the main 
                                                          
28 C. W. Gower, ‘Edgar G. Brown, a Civil Rights Advocate in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet”’, The 
Western Journal of Black Studies, Volume 8, Number 2 (Summer 1984) 114. 
29 ‘Walter White’, Encyclopedia Brittanica (online version 2018) https://www.britannica.com/biography/Walter 
-White-American-civil-rights-activist (13-03-2018). 
30 J. A. Jenkins, J. Peck and V. M. Weaver, ‘Between Reconstructions: Congressional Action on Civil Rights, 1891-
1940’, Studies in American Political Development (24 April 2010) 74. 
31 Jaynes, ‘Mary McLeod Bethune’, 99. 
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issues that was brought forward.32 Thus, this chapter aims to provide answers to the 
following questions: what was Bethune’s role in the anti-lynching debate? What did she 
achieve and to what extent was she able to convince Roosevelt to support a federal bill 
against lynching? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 ‘Mrs. Bethune: Spingarn Medalist’, The Crisis, Volume 42, Number 7 (July 1935) 202. 
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Chapter 1: A History of Anti-Lynching Legislation 
After 1865, when the Civil War had ended and reconstruction began, African 
Americans gained their freedom, as well as citizenship and the rights that came with it. 
White Southerners, however, refused to accept their former slaves as equals. Instead, they 
wanted to preserve white supremacy and suppress the black population.33 Among other 
things, they did so by spreading fear and lynching African American men, women and even 
children to make their point. Still, the question remains how it was possible for so many 
people to be bluntly murdered without any form of a (fair) trial, in a nation praised for its 
high standards of democracy, freedom and morality.34 Why did the debate about anti-
lynching legislation come up from the 1920s onwards? How did state and federal legislators 
attempt to combat these atrocities and to what extent were their efforts successful? These 
are the questions this chapter seeks to answer.       
 To this day, the exact number of lynchings remains unclear and authors tend to 
disagree with each other about these matters. R. L. Zangrando, for instance, argued that 
there had been more than 4700 lynchings between 1882 and 1968.35 Walter White 
supposedly had already uncovered 4951 lynchings between 1882 and 1927.36 The New York 
Times claimed that there had been 5073 lynchings by the mid-thirties,37 and yet another 
source stated that there were over 4700 African American victims alone.38 Still, most sources 
do agree that the vast majority of lynchings occurred in the Southern States. They do not 
deny that the lynchings were a national phenomenon, but lynchings in the South were, as W. 
Fitzhuge Brundage put it: ‘without parallel elsewhere.’39  
The highest number, 581, occurred in Mississippi; the second, 531, in Georgia; and 
 the third, 493, in Texas. There were over a hundred lynchings in Louisiana and 
 Alabama; over two hundred in Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, and Kentucky; and one 
                                                          
33 S. O. Pinder, ‘Anti-Lynching Bill’, in: K. Herr and G. L. Anderson, Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice 
(Thousand Oaks 2007) 161. 
34 Ibidem. 
35 Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade, 4. 
36 A. W. Pisciotta, ‘Lynching’, in: H. T. Greene and S. L. Gabbidon, Encyclopedia of Race and Crime (Thousand 
Oaks 2009) 466-467. 
37 ‘Anti-Lynching Law Urged’, New York Times (22 April 1935) 18 (online version 2017) 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/docview/101515896/7B481630000F4349PQ/34?accou
ntid=12045 (01-05-2017). 
38 Pisciotta, ‘Lynching’, 466-467. 
39 Kato, 5. 
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 hundred or more in South Carolina, Missouri, Oklahoma, North Carolina, and 
 Virginia.40 
 Southerners defended themselves by stating that lynchings only occurred to protect 
white womanhood.41 This became known as “The Rape Myth”.42 It was argued that lynchings 
were not desirable, but necessary when African American men were assaulting white 
women. They justified going outside the law and taking justice into their own hands because 
such crimes were unforgivable and they could not risk the perpetrator to go free.43 These 
“black brutes” had to be punished.44 If the assaults on white women would stop, so would 
the lynchings.45 This was argued so very often that newspapers began to refer to assault as 
“the usual crime” and the main cause of lynchings. The Ocala Evening Star, for instance, 
wrote about a lynching, stating that: ‘the usual crime met its almost inevitable 
punishment.’46          
 Ultimately, even congressmen were using these sorts of arguments in order to 
defend lynchings. They claimed the occurrences were inevitable when the safety of white 
women was at stake. Senator Williams of Mississippi, for instance, was convinced that: 
 When it comes to violating innocent women, it’s no time to go to court, […] but we 
 have here men pleading for law and order while helpless women are being treated by 
 beasts as they please, and yet these same men don’t want any international law.47 
                                                          
40 Park, ‘Lynching and Antilynching’, 312. 
41 J. Harris, ‘Southern Women Oppose Lynch Bill’, New York Times (28 April 1935) E6 (online version 2017) 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/docview/101516615/B02A5347A072479APQ/5?accou
ntid=12045 (01-05-2017). 
42 Park, 313. 
43 Harris, ‘Southern Women Oppose Lynch Bill’, E6.  
44 ‘Howard U. Students Hear Novelist Cite Cultural Progress’, The Washington Post (16 March 1924) ES17 
(online version 2018) https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/docview/149539877/ 
21E36F7C19824544PQ/2?accountid=12045 (30-05-2018). 
45 Ocala Evening Star (26 September 1922) 2 (online version 2017) 
http://chroniclingameraica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027621/1922-09-26/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=1789&index=3&rows=20 
&words=lynching+rape&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=Florida&date2=1924&proxtext=rape+lynching
&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 (03-09-2017). 
46 ‘A Rape and a Lynching’, The Ocala Evening Star (10 May 1909) 2 (online version 2017) 
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84027621/1909-05-10/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=1789&index=4&rows=20& 
words=LYNCHING+RAPE&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=Florida&date2=1924&proxtext=rape+lynching
&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 (03-09-2017). 
47 ‘Williams Hits Treaty Delay in Hot Speech’, The Pensacola Journal (30 September 1919) 1 (online version 
2017) http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn87062268/1919-09-30/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1789&index=5& 
rows=20&words=Assault+Lynching&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=Florida&date2=1924&proxtext=ass
ault+lynching&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 (03-09-2017). 
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In reality, however, most of the lynching victims were not even accused of assault; let alone 
that they were guilty of the crime. African Americans risked being lynched for crimes such 
as: insulting women, being disreputable, or peeping through windows.48 There are even 
cases where the victim was lynched for being “unpopular”.49 Eventually, lynchings were, to a 
certain extent, normalized. Therefore, it was not uncommon for journalists, who tried to 
write articles about lynchings, to hear arguments like the following: ‘We’re just killing a few 
negroes that we’ve waited too damn long about leaving for the buzzards. That’s not news.’50 
 Even though there were more than a few Americans who defended the act of 
lynching, the fact remained that people were being murdered without any form of a trial and 
this was difficult to justify from a legal or political point of view. For that reason, even those 
politicians who were (secretly) in favor of lynchings were unable to deny that they were 
undemocratic and knew something had to be done.51 After all, they were bad publicity for 
the United States. Therefore, some states decided to enact their own anti-lynching laws. In 
1893, the state of Georgia was the first to do so. This law provided for prison terms up to 
twenty years for any lynching that resulted in death.52 Other states that enacted similar laws 
were: Ohio, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, Michigan, Kansas, North- and South 
Carolina. 53           
 These measures were supposed to prove that Southerners were doing all they could 
to ‘assist the colored man in his upward march and protect him from wrong the same as 
others.’54 The South Carolina legislation, for instance, provided that: 
                                                          
48 Park, 311. 
49 ‘A Blow at Lynch’, Rock Island Daily Argus (14 March 1890) 2 (online version 2018) 
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn92053945/1890-03-14/ed-1/seq-
2/#date1=1789&index=1&rows=20&words=lynching+unpopularity&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=&d
ate2=1963&proxtext=lynching+unpopularity&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 (30-05-2018). 
50 R. M. Perloff, ‘The Press and Lynchings of African Americans’, Journal of Black Studies, Volume 30, Number 3 
(January 2000) 315. 
51 Jenkins, Peck and Weaver, ‘Between Reconstructions’, 68-77. 
52 H. L. Moon, ‘Law on Lynching is Pressed Again’, New York Times (18 April 1937) 71 (online version 2017) 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/docview/102252853/3982D477BD74424APQ/10?acco
untid=12045 (01-05-2017). 
53 Ibidem. 
54 ‘Anti-Lynching Bill’, The Broad Ax (25 January 1896) 2 (online version 2017) 
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84024055/1896-01-25/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=1865 &sort = relevan 
ce&rows=20&words=ANTI+ANTI-LYNCHING+LYNCHING&searchType=basic& sequence=0&index=5& state 
=&date2=1917&proxtext=anti-lynching&y=0&x=0&dateFilter Type=yearRange&page=2 (13-07-2017). 
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 In all cases of lynching where death ensues, the county where the lynching takes 
 place, shall be liable to exemplary damages in a sum not less than $2,000, to be 
 recovered in a competent court by the legal representative of the person lynched.55 
However, when push came to shove, the law would be interpreted in such a way that those 
who inflicted injustice would not be punished. Instead, it would simply ensure a sum of 
money to the relatives of the victims and even this was almost never enforced. Other state 
laws worked in similar ways. Therefore, they were only making empty promises.56 Zangrando 
notes that despite the fact that many states enacted such laws, less than one percent of the 
lynchings, since 1899, actually led to some sort of punitive measure.57   
 Lynchings appeared to prevail and it became clear to many Americans that federal 
anti-lynching legislation was necessary.58 Anti-lynching sentiments were growing throughout 
the decades. At first, most of these people did not necessarily care for equal rights between 
blacks and whites. They were, however, afraid that law and order would disappear. Many of 
them feared that: ‘If mobs of people can disregard with impunity one article of the 
Constitution, why not any one?’59 Another reason politicians began to show interest in the 
anti-lynching debate was the growing importance of the African American electorate. 
Especially in the Northern States, where their numbers had grown since the Great Migration, 
they could no longer be ignored. Therefore, multiple congressmen tried to gain their votes 
and became involved with issues concerning the black community.60 Thus, the debate about 
federal anti-lynching legislation began.        
 Between 1882 and 1951, 257 bills were introduced in Congress.61 However, it was not 
until 1918 that such legislation was seriously considered. That year, congressman Leonidas 
C. Dyer introduced the Dyer Anti-lynching Bill in the House of Representatives. Even though 
                                                          
55 Ibidem. 
56 Ibidem. 
57 Zangrando, ‘The NAACP and a Federal Antilynching Bill’, The Journal of Negro History, Volume 50, Number 2 
(April 1965) 108. 
58 G. B. Stone, ‘Lynching Fallacy’, The Washington Post (1 April 1935) 8 (online version 2017) 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/docview/150837078/6AE68B09BB234457PQ/1?accou
ntid=12045 (01-05-2017). 
59 ‘The Lynching Business’, The Washington Post (4 May 1935) 8 (online version 2017) 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/docview/150673143/B04AA3DEF7484380PQ/5?accou
ntid=12045 (01-05-2017). 
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the first draft never made it out of the House Committee on the Judiciary, it was 
reintroduced in 1921 and became the first bill to make it to a vote in the House. On the 26th 
of January in 1922, it passed by a vote of 231 to 119. 62 However, it was not until the bill was 
up for consideration in the Senate that the real struggle for its enforcement began. 
 The division between those who were in favor of the bill and those who were against 
it was almost entirely along party lines.63 The Democrats (especially those from the South) 
were fiercely against federal legislation, while the Republicans were in favor of the bill.64 At 
this point, the argument that lynchings were used to protect white womanhood was still 
used, but even the opposition knew it was not convincing enough to stop the bill. Therefore, 
they put more emphasis on the supposed unconstitutionality of the measure.65 The 
Democrats argued that federal anti-lynching legislation could not be constitutional, since it 
was in violation of states’ rights. They claimed that lynchings were nothing more than 
murders and murders had to be dealt with by the states. They went even further by stating 
that the Dyer bill was simply proposed to turn the states into “vassals” of an absolute 
national government.66          
 The Republicans struggled to counter such arguments. Still, they did argue that 
states’ rights were irrelevant and trivial when it came to justice and social welfare for the 
people.67 They stated that the lynch mob ‘institutes a reign of terror and lawlessness and 
sets an example of impunity for the brutal and degenerate.’68 Therefore, the federal 
government had no choice but to intervene.69 The proponents of the bill argued that ‘If a 
governmental unit fails to protect a person from mob violence, or properly to prosecute his 
assailants, that person has clearly been denied the most fundamental of his constitutional 
rights.’70          
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 However, these arguments were countered by the opposition. They stated that most 
States had enforced their own anti-lynching legislation, and if these laws did not work, why 
would a federal law be any different?71 ‘Lynching already goes unpunished in spite of State 
laws and […] if jurors in a State court will not agree to convict, it is unlikely that jurors in a 
Federal court in the same locality would vote otherwise.’72 Still, the Republicans held a 
(small) majority in the Senate. Therefore, the Democrats started a filibuster, led by Senators 
Underwood, Harrison and Caraway.        
 These men threatened to halt any Senate business until the Dyer Bill was put to 
rest.73 Eventually, the Republicans gave in to their demands, since they had other important 
matters to discuss as well. Thus, the bill failed to pass. According to D. Kato and R. L. 
Zangrando, this meant that the Dyer Anti-lynching Bill was not just displaced by the strategy 
of its enemies but also by the indifference of its friends.74 Its proponents decided that ending 
the blockade of the Democrats and being able to discuss other matters was more important 
than establishing a bill to save the lives of African Americans. However, this does not mean 
that the debate about the Dyer Bill was irrelevant. Not only did the proposal of the bill show 
that satisfying black voters became increasingly more important, its failure showed the 
growing dissatisfaction among these voters with the Republican party and civil rights 
issues.75            
 To ensure that federal anti-lynching legislation would not be enforced, Southern 
politicians tried to end the lynchings themselves. Therefore, the numbers declined 
dramatically between 1922 and 1930.76 Unfortunately, racial violence became a larger and 
more intensified issue during the years of the Great Depression and the struggle for federal 
anti-lynching legislation was yet again revived.77 Senators E. P. Costigan and R. F. Wagner 
introduced one of the more prominent bills of this era on the 4th of January in 1934.78 The 
Costigan-Wagner bill was in many aspects like the Dyer Anti-lynching Bill. The most 
prominent difference between the two, was that the senators who introduced it were both 
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(Northern) Democrats.79 The bill sought to empower the federal government to ‘invade state 
jurisdictions when state or local officials “fail or refuse” to prevent a lynching.’80 It did so by 
creating a penalty of imprisonment or $5000 fines for the officers who failed to prevent or 
punish mob violence and it demanded that the county in which the lynching had occurred 
would pay a $10.000 fine to the family of the victim.81     
 In February, the bill was up for consideration in the Senate, and on the 12th of April it 
was favorably reported by the Committee on the Judiciary. However, the bill met the same 
sort of resistance from Southern congressmen as the Dyer bill had endured before it. 
Although most of the opponents no longer believed they could simply defend lynchings, they 
did try to rationalize them. They claimed that lynchings were occurring in order to protect 
their wives and daughters in the South, the sanctity of their homes and the integrity of the 
white race.82 They argued again that federal legislation undermined states’ rights and would 
expand the powers of the federal government.83 In their turn, the proponents of the bill 
argued that such rights were not important compared to the rights of citizens who were 
being brutally murdered without any form of a trial. Senator Costigan stated that: ‘We meet 
in the eighth century following Magna Charta, […] to discuss whether Congress should 
hesitate to extend the principle that no freeman shall be seized or imprisoned except by the 
law of the land.’84          
 Still, because of the threat to filibuster again, the Democratic leadership refused to 
take up the measure for full debate.85 Therefore, the Senate adjourned in June without 
considering the bill. Yet, Costigan and Wagner were determined to continue their quest for 
its enactment and reintroduced their bill with the opening of the 74th Congress, on the 4th of 
January 1935.86 Soon after, the Committee on the Judiciary reported that the bill would be 
up for consideration on the floor of the Senate in April. This was good news for the bills’ 
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supporters, since, according to T. Catledge’s article in the New York Times, ‘the Senate ha[d] 
already shown in two previous tests that it would adopt the motion if given a chance to vote 
upon it.’87 Thus, the Southern opposition was willing to do everything in their power to 
prevent the voting.           
 They started a weeklong filibuster and promised to continue to stop the 
consideration of the bill, even if it took all summer.88 According to another New York Times 
article, the Southern senators were all planning to take the floor and hold it for as long as 
they could. Most of them had entered the Senate with bundles of documents under their 
arms to make sure they had enough fuel to keep the filibuster going.89 Eventually, their 
threats to continue all summer were enough to end the consideration of the Costigan-
Wagner bill, and on the 1st of May the second effort to adjourn passed by a vote of 48 to 
32.90 In the end, the bill was shoved aside after only 6 days of filibustering, in order to 
discuss the more pressing veterans’ bonus.91      
 Yet, not all hope was lost. From 1935 onwards, another Democratic congressman had 
pursued the enactment of federal anti-lynching legislation, Representative J. Gavagan from 
New York. In 1936, he introduced his bill in the House of Representatives.92 However, he was 
not the only one to do so. Several bills were up for consideration by the House Committee 
on the Judiciary and the chairman of this committee, Hatton Sumners of Texas, was opposed 
to federal legislation. He tried to undermine the consideration of Gavagan’s bill. Instead, he 
decided to support the much weaker bill of Representative A. Mitchell, the only African 
American member in the House.93 Hatton later admitted that he ‘quite frankly […] had not 
believed that […] [supporters of anti-lynching legislation] would have the nerve to oppose 
passage of a bill introduced by the one Negro member of Congress.’94    
 Still, Gavagan issued a discharge petition to force House consideration of his bill and 
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was able to get the 218 signatures that were required.95 In the meantime, the Mitchell bill 
was refused by a vote of 257 to 123. Therefore, the Gavagan bill was able to move to the 
floor of the House. On the 15th of April 1937, it passed by a vote of 277 to 120.96 He called it 
a ‘great victory for law and order […] and a great triumph for a Democratic House.’97 
However, the bill had yet to move to the floor of the Senate.     
 In June 1937, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved the Gavagan bill by a 
vote of 12 to 3. Unfortunately, the debate was scheduled for August. Therefore, its 
supporters had to fight to ensure the consideration of the bill before adjournment of the 
Senate.98 Its opponents, however, called for early adjournment. In the end, they had to 
compromise. Thus, the Senate was set to start the consideration of the bill during a special 
session in late November.99 Even though there were multiple signs of progress, the issues 
were piling up and in January 1938, Southern congressmen, yet again, started a filibuster.100 
 According to Zangrando, this time the filibuster consisted not only of constitutional 
traditionalism, but also of ‘political expediency and outright racist slurs.’101 It lasted for six 
weeks and even though the bills’ proponents had tried to push for a vote on the bill, their 
efforts fell incredibly short of the necessary two-thirds approval, with an outcome of 37 to 
51. It was clear that the position of the Gavagan Anti-lynching Bill was a hopeless one. 
Eventually even its most prominent supporters, Senator Wagner and Van Nuys, admitted 
that it was necessary to attend to other matters. Therefore, ‘the filibuster ended; the bill 
was dead and unlamentedly buried.’102       
 At first sight, the history of federal anti-lynching legislation is not a very successful 
story. Lynchings had been occurring frequently from 1882 onwards and it was not until 1918 
that federal interference with the issue was seriously considered. In the 36 years before the 
Dyer bill was up for consideration, almost nothing was done to end these atrocities. But even 
more importantly, when federal legislation was finally put up for consideration, it was 
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unable to pass because a minority in the Senate refused to let such bills come to a vote. 
Whether that says more about the determination of its opponents or that of its proponents, 
remains unclear. At least, G. C. Rable argued that:    
 Strangely enough, defeat came at the hands of both the bill’s enemies and its friends. 
 The adamant Southern opposition had given lukewarm Republican supporters an 
 excuse to abandon the bill after they had already reaped the political rewards from 
 their earlier endorsement.103         
However, the mere fact that these matters were up for consideration, not just once 
but three times, ensured the spread of national awareness, sentiment and the realization 
that African Americans were becoming increasingly more important voters. The number of 
lynchings seemed to decline, simply because these matters were being discussed on a 
national level; and even though the bills were never enforced, they contributed to and 
encouraged the Civil Rights movement in the years to come. Therefore, its history may have 
been terrible, but the struggle for the Dyer-, Costigan-Wagner- and Gavagan bills was not in 
vain.  
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Chapter 2: Roosevelt’s Support 
The 1930s in the United States are inextricably linked to the Great Depression. This era is 
known for one of the most severe economic crises America has ever seen. Over 25 percent 
of the workforce became unemployed, commerce had stagnated, factories were forced to 
close their doors and farmers and homeowners were facing foreclosures.104 It was during 
this time that Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presidency on the fourth of March 1933.105 
He faced the difficult task to reduce the unemployment rate and to create an overall better 
economic environment. Therefore, he introduced: The New Deal. This program aimed to 
restore the balance to the economy. It called, among other things, for the increase of 
workers’ wages and farm income, it provided immediate relief for the destitute and it tried 
to control the financial manipulation of investment houses, banks and exchanges.106  
 However, even though Roosevelt had become ‘the most popular president among 
blacks since Lincoln’107, and the New Deal programs provided some aid for African 
Americans, racism and discrimination still seemed to plague the distribution of its 
resources.108 During the depression years, lynchings had once again increased. According to 
I. Katznelson, ‘lynching dominated the headlines as at no other time in American history, its 
prevalence a reflection of how dark economic fears can be expressed through racial 
malignancy.’109 Therefore, this chapter focuses on the role President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
played in the debate about lynching. What were his views? What did he do in order to end 
the lynchings and why did he act the way he did?       
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the number of lynchings decreased quite rapidly 
after the first anti-lynching bill failed to pass in the Senate. Its opponents were not 
necessarily against the horrors, but they did try to stop them. They realized that if the 
lynchings were to continue, the federal government would eventually step in. Thus, to avoid 
federal interference, they had no choice but to act against it themselves. These efforts paid 
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off, since the lynchings indeed steadily declined between 1920 and 1929. However, with the 
stock market crash of 1929 and the economic hardships that followed, racist acts of violence 
began to increase again. It reached its peak in the year 1933 with a total of 26 lynchings in 
the South.110 This was the same year Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presidency and 
introduced his New Deal.         
 During that time, the President’s main concern was ‘reversing the depression and 
reestablishing some semblance of economic stability.’111 His administration had little 
understanding of the black community. So, instead they focused primarily on the general 
humanitarian sentiments.112 However, the increase in racist sentiments and the violence 
that came with it, had not gone unnoticed by all. The newly appointed President received 
hundreds of appeals from and on behalf of the African American population and during both 
his first and second term Roosevelt was continuously asked to take the lead in the campaign 
against lynching.113           
 At first, many of these anti-lynching advocates were turned away without having the 
chance to speak with anyone from the Roosevelt administration, let alone have an audience 
with the President himself. In August 1933, for instance, Charles H. Houston, a prominent 
lawyer, wrote a letter to Stephen T. Early, the White House Press Secretary. In this letter 
Houston expresses his disappointment with the treatment he had received when arriving at 
the White House. He had hoped to meet with the President, or at least with one of his 
representatives. Instead, he was told, after waiting for hours, to return home.114 He stated 
the following: 
 It appears to us that that official [who turned us away] was sensitive as to the effect 
 which the President’s receiving such a delegation on such a mission would have on 
 certain sections of the country, with resultant repercussions on the N R A program. 
 We protest that the lives and physical protection of American citizens are just as 
 important as any N R A program can ever be; and that the traditional policy of 
 temporizing with injustice and disrespect of law is to a great extent responsible for 
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 the moral collapse and selfishness exhibited in so many quarters to-day. The law and
 constituted authority are supreme only as they cover the humblest and forgotten 
 citizen.115  
Mr. Early reacted by stating that Houston had simply arrived during the busiest part of the 
day. To which Houston replied:  
We did not expect you to see us out of turn, but we did want our turn. […] We had no 
 objection to waiting until you were free. What we did object to was the summary 
 manner in which our request going to the fundamental protection of citizens’ rights 
 was disposed of.116 
Mr. Houston was not the only one who was denied an audience with the President to 
talk about these matters. In the first two years of his presidency, Roosevelt had already 
received many letters about the urgency to act against lynchings. There were those anti-
lynching advocates who stated that the President’s silence in this matter would be 
interpreted as indifference.117 Others argued that the lynchings were bad publicity for the 
country, which were making other countries believe that lawlessness reigned in the United 
States.118 Some tried to convince the President by stating that the lynchings were unchristian 
and true Christians should speak out against such horrors,119 and yet other writers called 
upon Roosevelt as the leader of American public opinion and saw it as his duty to make a 
statement against lynching.120 The one thing all of these anti-lynching advocates had in 
common was the hope that the President would speak out against these ‘national crimes.’121 
Most of them, however, were never granted an audience with anyone of the Roosevelt 
administration and those who did, did not get much out of it.   
 However, with the introduction of the Costigan-Wagner Anti-Lynching Bill and 
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especially after its success in the House of Representatives, the President was no longer able 
to ignore the issues in front of him. Not only because the matters were extensively discussed 
in the newspapers, but also because his own wife had become actively involved with anti-
lynching advocates. Between 1933 and 1935, Eleanor Roosevelt had already emerged as a 
spokesperson for the New Deal and publicly investigated the conditions in migrant camps, 
coal mines and in city slums.122        
 During this same period, she had advocated the controversial cause of racial 
tolerance as well. Her outspoken support for racial equity, her promotion of education for 
African Americans and her support of federal anti-lynching legislation made her a popular 
figure among the black population.123 It was primarily because of Eleanor Roosevelt that the 
White House started to open its doors for anti-lynching advocates. These doors had 
remained closed mainly because Mr. Early and his appointments secretary, Marvin McIntyre, 
were a restraining influence on the President.124 Therefore, Mrs. Roosevelt’s support of the 
federal bill made for a ‘constant irritation to certain of FDR’s advisers who believed her 
activities with and for Negroes damaged the President’s relations with the white South.’125
 This conservative South was the main reason Roosevelt had remained hesitant 
towards supporting anti-lynching legislation, or any federal legislation that would benefit 
African Americans for that matter. The states of the former Confederacy denied or at least 
restricted voting rights to black citizens and ‘used their political power further to diminish 
their status and to deny them the benefits of opportunities of society.’126 They would not 
stand for a president who endorsed anti-lynching legislation. Of course, most of them did 
not say this out loud. They still argued that federal interference was a violation of states’ 
rights and lynching was something the states had to deal with themselves. Therefore, the 
Roosevelt administration pursued a strategy of pragmatic forgetfulness towards racial 
matters for as long as it could.127 They needed the Conservative Southern wing on their side 
to ensure their New Deal bills would pass.       
 As D. M. Kennedy wrote in his article, ‘How FDR Lost the Struggle to Enact an 
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Antilynching Bill’: ‘A frontal assault on the South’s racial system […] would irretrievably 
alienate the white Southern political establishment, fracture his party beyond repair, and 
indefinitely deadlock the Congress.’128 The President feared that action on his part in favor of 
anti-lynching legislation would drive the powerful Southern wing of his party into the arms 
of the Republicans. 129 In 1935, when the Costigan-Wagner bill was up for consideration in 
the Senate and the filibuster against it had started, Roosevelt even expressed his irritation 
not only with the southern filibusterers but also with ‘the Northern Democrats who had 
insisted on bringing up the antilynching bill.’130 The President’s legislative program 
temporarily hit a wall because of sectional bitterness about anti-lynching legislation.131 
 In the end, the Costigan-Wagner bill failed to pass because the majority in Congress 
was unwilling to support the measure if it meant stalling other important Senate business. 
The White House was annoyed with the fact that the Senate became tied up at all, since 
their main focus was the passing of the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, 
the New Banking Act and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act.132 As Zangrando put it: 
‘No less than in the days of the Dyer bill, the Costigan-Wagner measure […] suffered from 
southern intransigence and from the higher priorities that national leaders accorded to 
other aspects of America’s domestic and foreign policies.’133     
 Even though this attitude from the President towards anti-lynching issues was 
politically expedient and ensured the Southern support of his New Deal, Roosevelt received 
a lot of criticism from supporters of the bill as well. For example, Eustace Gay, editor of the 
Philadelphia Tribune, send a copy of a newspaper article to Mr. Early, in February 1936, to 
bring to his attention that Northern newspapers were not pleased with the President’s 
silence in the anti-lynching debate.134 The article was called ‘Roosevelt Approves Lynching’ 
and it stated the following:  
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 President Roosevelt evidently agrees with County Attorney O. P. More, in Texas who 
 stated, after two colored boys had been lynched, that he did not intend to take any 
 action because the lynching was “an expression of the will of the people”. This 
 conclusion is reached because the President has joined hands with the Southern bloc 
 of Democrats. […] The President was urged, begged and supplicated to move his little 
 finger to indicate his attitude. […] It will arise to damn him not only at the next
 election but will affect his sleep every time a human being is lynched. Because he 
 must realize that he, by his silence, gave his approval to the institution of lynching. 
 The greatest “liberal” has chosen to join the mob-o-crats of Georgia, Texas and 
 Mississippi.135   
However, criticism did not just come from disappointed Northerners. Southerners like 
Mississippi’s Pat Harrison or South Carolina’s James Byrnes, some of Roosevelt’s most 
reliable New Deal supporters, stated that the President and the Democrats of the North had 
deserted the South.136 Still, despite the harsh words of some Americans, Roosevelt did 
ensure his overall popularity throughout the country and he was reelected in 1936.137  
 However, the triumphs of the New Deal cannot be severed from the sorrows. As 
Katznelson stated in his book, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, ‘No 
noteworthy lawmaking the New Deal accomplished could have passed without [Southern] 
consent.’138 Therefore, Southern representatives were able to influence the political 
landscape and the White House let them do so in order to hold on to their support for the 
New Deal programs.139 They turned a blind eye towards the organized system of racial 
cruelty in the South.140 This lack of governmental action ensured a more resentful and 
extremist Southern camp, which made it all the more difficult for that same government to 
enact reforms.141           
 So far, this chapter has focused on what the President did not do and the reasons 
why he did not do it. However, it should be noted that he was not completely indifferent 
towards the fight against lynchings. After the Southern filibuster in 1936, a spokesman for 
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the Postmaster General, James Farley, assured the black press that Roosevelt was personally 
not against the Costigan-Wagner bill.142 The President even publicly proposed an alternative, 
when the pending bill was defeated, whereby the federal government would investigate all 
lynchings and report back to the administration, Congress and to the nation at large.143 
Unfortunately, nothing came of the idea.144      
 Even though he never really endorsed it publicly, the President privately supported 
anti-lynching legislation. He did peek the suspicion of some Southern senators, among which 
was Josiah Bailey, who believed that the President was secretly supporting Senator 
Wagner.145 Indeed, he did help the authors of the anti-lynching legislation. At the time the 
Costigan-Wagner bill was up for consideration in congress, he had had multiple meetings 
with both senators and provided them with records on the subject. In 1937, for instance, 
Roosevelt wrote Wagner the following: 
Dear Bob, I am sending you this “off the record” in order that you may read Homer 
 Commungs’ letter and his memorandum. In view of his doubt of the wisdom of 
 preparing any formal opinion or of my transmitting it, I think that you […] should only 
 reed this memorandum and return it to me without using it publicly.146   
He was willing to support them, but only “off the record”.     
 Even though he did not publicly support the anti-lynching bill, Roosevelt did condemn 
the practice of lynching as ‘a vile form of collective murder’.147 On 6 December 1933, he 
addressed the Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America148 to make the following 
statement:  
We know that it is murder and a deliberate and definite disobedience of the 
 commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” We do not excuse those in high places or the 
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 low who condone lynch law. But a thinking America goes further. It seeks a 
 government of its own that will be sufficiently strong to protect the prisoner and at 
 the same time to crystalize a public opinion so clear that government of all kinds will 
 be compelled to practice a more certain justice. The judicial function of government 
 is the protection of the individual and of the community through quick and certain 
 justice.149  
The appeals the President had received to speak out against the practice, ensured his 
reaction not only towards the Church Council, but he also condemned lynching in his annual 
message to Congress on January 3rd, 1934. He even asked for governmental action to put an 
end to the lynchings.150 Immediately after, Roosevelt received a lot of praise for his public 
assertion that ‘this form of crime along with others calls on the strong arm of government 
for immediate suppression.’151 Still, even though the President had asked for federal 
legislation, he refused to support any specific bills.152      
 When the Wagner-Van Nuys bill was up for consideration in Congress in 1938, the 
President was asked to comment on the premise that lynching would become a federal 
offense and would hold county governments financially responsible for loss of life. He stated 
that he personally believed that if the bill failed to pass the Senate, the discussion about the 
subject should not end there.153 Thus, even though he was yet again unwilling to insist on 
the bills’ passage, he did propose that ‘either the legislative or executive branch of the 
Federal Government [should] provide some permanent machinery to investigate lynchings 
and incidents of mob violence.’154        
 Overall, during his second term, the President became less willing to publicly support 
anti-lynching legislation. Even though he was reelected in 1936 and was overwhelmingly 
popular, the beginning of his second term was quite disappointing since the Supreme Court 
had struck down a lot of his New Deal proposals.155 Roosevelt, therefore, was more focused 
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on his legislative program than ever before. He even tried to change the Supreme Court by 
enlarging its number, in order for his new proposals to become enacted.156 Therefore, it 
came as no surprise when he refused to be ‘drawn into the antilynching controversy, 
insisting that Congress alone must decide it.’157      
 It was in 1942 that Roosevelt publicly spoke in favor of federal anti-lynching 
legislation. After the lynching of Cleo Wright in that same year, the United States 
Department of Justice became, for the first time, actually involved with a specific lynching.158 
Afterwards, the President even ordered federal investigation of all lynchings.159 Even though 
this was a great step forwards, and a push towards civil rights, it came a little too late for the 
anti-lynching debate. Fortunately, the number of lynchings had declined again during the 
1940s. Therefore, the need for anti-lynching legislation became less pressing and no major 
proposal was introduced after the Gavagan bill had failed to pass. Antilynching legislation 
became lost in the broader debate about civil rights in the decades to come.160 Therefore, 
even though Roosevelt publicly denounced the practice of lynching and eventually even 
supported federal action against it, he never became the public spokesperson in favor of 
anti-lynching legislation the supporters of the pending bills had hoped he would be. 
 In the end, anti-lynching legislation simply was not a priority for this president. Many 
anti-lynching crusaders believed that Roosevelt could have ensured the passing of either the 
Costigan-Wagner or the Gavagan bill.161 If he had decided to publicly speak out in favor of 
such legislation, the filibusters might not have been as successful as they were.162 It was the 
pressing need for recovery programs and the strong Southern bloc in Congress that kept him 
silent on these matters. The President and his informers were actively ‘looking for excuses 
not to investigate even those lynchings that did seem to fall within the federal government’s 
purview.’163    
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Chapter 3: Walter White, the NAACP and the Anti-lynching Debate 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on what President Roosevelt did in favor of anti-
lynching legislation, as well as what he neglected to do, this chapter focuses on Walter 
Francis White. Nowadays, White is well-remembered for the part he played within the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and especially for the efforts he 
made in favor of anti-lynching legislation. He was one of the most prominent figures in the 
debate. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the following question: To what extent was 
Walter White able to convince President Roosevelt to endorse anti-lynching legislation 
during the 1930s? What did he do to make the enactment of both the Gavagan and 
Costigan-Wagner bills a possibility? What was his role in the debate and, finally, what did he 
eventually achieve?           
 Born in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1893, with blond hair and blue eyes, White could have 
easily passed for a white man. However, he was from African American decent: 
 I am a Negro. There can be no doubt. I know the night when, in terror and bitterness 
 of soul, I discovered that I was set apart by the pigmentation of my skin (invisible 
 though it was in my case) and the moment of which I decided that I would infinitely 
 rather be what I was than, through taking advantage of the way of escape that was 
 open to me, be one of the race which had forced the decision upon me.164 
White had devoted his life to the improvement of the living conditions of blacks in the 
United States.165 At times, his appearance worked in favor of this cause, especially when he 
was investigating lynchings and race riots in the Deep South.166 His devotion to the anti-
lynching crusade came forth from his personal experiences with racial violence. For instance, 
at the age of thirteen, during the Atlanta riot of 1906, he and his family had had to protect 
their own home against the rage of a mob.167 It was because of experiences like this that 
White decided to join the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People a few 
years later.168           
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 The NAACP itself was created out of necessity after a similar race riot in Springfield, 
Illinois in 1908 had gotten out of hand.169 Its formation was prompted in order to ‘protect 
[…] the interests of the colored race.’170 It was in 1918, at the age of 25, that White joined 
the Association as executive secretary. At that time, the Dyer Anti-lynching Bill was pending 
in the House of Representatives and the NAACP was involved in its struggle for enactment. 
This was also the time of the so-called “Red Summer”, a period of many race riots and 
lynchings. These riots aggravated race relations even further. Therefore, from this period 
onwards, the NAACP decided to focus most of its energy on the fight against mob 
violence.171 However, as discussed in the previous chapters, the Dyer Bill ultimately failed to 
pass, and it was not until the 1930s that the organization became successfully involved with 
another federal anti-lynching bill.         
 In 1931, White became the executive secretary of the Association and their foremost 
spokesperson in the debate about lynchings.172 Throughout the next decade, he devoted 
most of his time to the anti-lynching debate. He tried to convince the general public of the 
necessity of the proposed bills. His anti-lynching campaign included participation in rallies, 
marches, conferences, lawsuits, press releases, the publication of articles condemning the 
horrors, and, of course, meetings with political leaders.173 More than once, White even put 
his own life in danger to investigate the lynchings in the Deep South.174   
 In order to spread awareness about the phenomena, he wrote various books as well. 
One of them was called: Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch. It served its purpose. 
As Florence Finch Kelly argued immediately after its publication:  
 It is with a distinct jolt to one’s Americanism that one reads at the very beginning of 
 Walter White’s book and again and again through its pages that lynching has become 
 “an almost integral part of our national folkways.” The statement carries a challenge 
 to national self-complacency that urges on to the reading of the book to see what the 
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 author can say in proof of so appalling a charge. […] He makes it evident that it is the 
 situation itself, and all that has led to it and is responsible for its continuing and 
 malign power, that offers the challenge to national self-esteem and cries aloud for 
 extirpation.175  
 White wrote various articles and other publications as well. By doing so, he hoped to 
persuade the general public of the importance of federal anti-lynching legislation.176 In 1934, 
he stated that: ‘An aroused public opinion and it alone can insure enactment of this very 
needed legislation.’177 To the same effect, he made several public appearances at trials and 
conventions. In 1933, for instance, he addressed the crowd at the Crawford trial at Leesburg, 
Virginia, with the following statement: 
 Since 1882, 5.050 persons have been lynched by American mobs, this number 
 including 3.599 Negroes and 1.451 whites. […] The N.A.A.C.P. has asked Senator 
 Edward P. Costigan of Colorado to introduce in the coming session a bill to give the 
 Federal Government authority to act when and if State authorities fail to act against 
 lynchers. Every American […] who is wise enough to see the horrible future toward 
 which we are headed unless lynch law is eradicated should let each of the United 
 States senators from his State and his Congressmen know in no unmistakable terms 
 his desire that members of Congress support Federal legislation against the mob.178 
White believed that if Americans (especially those in the South) supported the efforts 
in favor of a federal law, Southern politicians in Congress could not justify acting against it.179 
He feared that if the public would remain silent, anti-lynching legislation would not stand a 
chance. Throughout his career he encouraged the American people to speak out against the 
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horrors. In 1936, for instance, he stated that: ‘Unless public opinion lets [the Judiciary] 
committee, the White House and individual senators know it wants this resolution reported 
favorably, it is going to be smothered […] by the forces which oppose corrective action 
against lynching.’180          
 White went to Congress many times in person as well. In February 1934, he appeared 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and testified against the notion that the black man’s 
sexual perversion was the inevitable cause for lynchings.181 Even though, the NAACP’s 
testimony seemed to prove decisive and the Costigan-Wagner bill was passed by the 
committee, in the end, White was unable to convince the Southern opposition of the 
necessity of anti-lynching legislation.182        
 Even some Republicans seemed indifferent to his appeals. Senator W. E. Borah, of 
Idaho, is perhaps the most significant example of a Northerner who refused to support 
federal anti-lynching legislation. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee he had 
sealed the fate of the Dyer Bill when he declared it to be unconstitutional in 1922.183 Even 
though he was no longer chairman in the 1930s, he was still an important and outspoken 
senator. Therefore, when, in 1935, Borah declared to be against the Costigan-Wagner bill 
once again, White responded quite vigorously: 
 [You hold] the somewhat dubious honor of having been the executioner of two 
 distinctly hopeful opportunities for stamping out lynching. […] Do you feel proud of 
 your handiwork Senator Borah? […] There are many Americans, Senator Borah, who 
 no longer believe in the sincerity of members of the Senate who forget states’ rights 
 when such issues as prohibition are being discussed, but who wrap about themselves 
 the mantle of constitutionality when the lives of human beings are taken by lawless 
 mobs.184  
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Through publications, letters and articles like this, White did succeed in spreading awareness 
throughout the country. However, it was never enough to prevent the filibusters in the 
Senate. Therefore, White had to look for support in higher places.   
 He contacted various organizations, newspapers and other businesses to ensure the 
passage of an anti-lynching bill.185 He became active on local, as well as on national forums 
and became quite successful in the art of persuasion.186 However, there was one man White 
tried to convince of this cause above all: Franklin D. Roosevelt. He hoped that with the 
support of the president of the United States, the cry for anti-lynching legislation could no 
longer be ignored. This task, however, turned out to be more complicated than White or the 
NAACP had anticipated.        
 When the President was elected, hope was restored for a lot of Americans, including 
many African Americans. They trusted that the progressive leader would improve their living 
conditions. This environment of newly found hope and the increase in lynchings in previous 
years, made the serious consideration of another anti-lynching bill possible.187 From the 
beginning, White was inextricably connected to this struggle and would remain so until 
1949. At first, he believed that it was just a matter of time before such a law would be 
enacted and he had good hope that the President would support this cause.188  
 Unfortunately, as discussed in the previous chapter, the President was not quite that 
eager to become involved in the matter. It was only after months of persuasion, especially 
from the NAACP, that Roosevelt decided to speak out against the lynchings themselves 
during the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Federal Council of 
Churches of Christ in America.189 During this speech, however, he was careful to condemn 
the practice of lynching, but he never expressed his support for federal legislation. 
Therefore, White continued to contact the White House. He tried to reach out to the 
President himself, the First Lady, the presidential secretary Marvin McIntyre, Stephen Early 
and other White House administrators.       
 In April 1934, the Costigan-Wagner Bill was introduced in the Senate. White knew 
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that he had rallied enough senators to vote in favor of the bill. He also knew that many 
senators were up for election in November. Most of them would not dare to oppose the 
anti-lynching bill if that meant that they would lose black votes.190 He did everything he 
could to ensure a vote as soon as possible. Thus, he turned to the administration. 
Unfortunately, most of his attempts to contact the President were turned down by the 
presidential secretary, Marvin McIntyre. It was rumored that McIntyre favored the 
Southerners position in the debate and was not a fan of federal anti-lynching legislation.191 
Subsequently, most of White’s letters received a response like the following: ‘Cannot 
arrange appointment requested at this time […] President extremely busy on matters 
requiring immediate attention.’192 While White remained unable to arrange a meeting with 
the President through the White House officials, he did not give up.    
 Through his correspondence with the First Lady he tried to gain both her support and 
that of her husband. Throughout the years they wrote multiple letters to each other and met 
frequently to talk about matters like the anti-lynching debate. Eleanor Roosevelt even wrote 
to the White House Press Secretary, Stephen T. Early that:  
If I were colored, I think I should have about the same obsession that he had. […] The 
 type of thing which would make him get himself arrested in the Senate restaurant is 
 probably an inferiority complex which he tries to combat and which makes him far 
 more aggressive than if he felt equality. […] If you ever talked to him and knew him, I 
 think you would feel as I do. He really is a very fine person with the sorrows of his 
 people close to his heart.193 
She identified with White and tried to help him. So, when he wrote her in April 1934 and 
explained the situation to her, she was willing to listen. He emphasized the fact that even 
though there were enough votes in favor of the bill, it would not be brought up before the 
adjournment of the Senate unless the White House insisted upon it.194 White also expressed 
his fear of an increase in the number of lynchings if the bill would not come to pass.195 He 
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ended this letter by asking the First Lady to discuss these facts with the President.196 
 In early May, Eleanor Roosevelt responded with the following: 
 The President talked to me rather at length today about the lynching bill. As I do not 
 think you will either like or agree with everything that he thinks, I would like an 
 opportunity of telling you about it, and would also like you to talk to the President if 
 you feel you want to. Therefore, will you let me know if you are going to be in 
 Washington before long?197 
Thus, White was finally able to meet with Roosevelt to discuss the Costigan-Wagner bill in 
person on May 6th, 1934.         
 In his autobiography, A Man Called White, he wrote about this encounter with the 
President: ‘Since he had entered the White House my contacts with him had been few, but 
at the conference arranged by his wife […] there developed between us a closer relationship 
which was destined to last to the day of his death.’198 It was a rare occasion, since their 
meeting was not inside the White House but on the porch, and they were accompanied by 
both Roosevelt’s wife Eleanor and his mother, Sara Delano Roosevelt.199 According to White, 
Roosevelt tried to avoid the subject of anti-lynching legislation by telling as many amusing 
stories and anecdotes as he could.200 The First Lady had already warned White that the 
President was not yet convinced of the arguments made in White’s letters.   
 Still, he was able to speak with Roosevelt about the issues at hand for more than an 
hour.201 White recalled the following: 
 The President then told me of another argument which one of the filibusterers had 
 made and I was able to present facts in refutation. When this had happened three or 
 four times, the President turned sharply and declared, “Somebody’s been priming 
 you. Was it my wife?” I smiled and suggested that we stick to our discussion of the 
 bill. The President then asked Mrs. Roosevelt if she had coached me, and she too 
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 smiled and suggested that the President stick to the subject. Laughing, the President
  turned to his mother to say, “Well at least I know you’ll be on my side.” The 
 President’s mother shook her head and expressed the opinion that she agreed with 
 Mr. White. Being a good loser, the President roared with laughter and confessed 
 defeat. But I gained from my visit only a moral victory.202 
 White believed he had at least convinced Roosevelt about the constitutionality of the 
Costigan-Wagner bill. However, he failed to make the President see that the bill was 
absolutely necessary and that his support could guarantee its passage. According to the 
White House Press Secretary, S. T. Early, White’s meeting with Roosevelt was quite 
productive. He stated that ‘at the close of the interview, certain doubts which the President 
had had regarding the enforceability of some parts of the measure appeared to have 
vanished.’203 The President even promised White that he would personally meet with both 
Senators Wagner and Costigan.204         
 Thus, a few weeks later White had arranged such a meeting. At the senators’ request, 
White remained absent.205 They believed that at the current time, his presence would be a 
distraction from the issue at hand. This was argued, because the presidential secretary 
Marvin McIntyre was a supporter of the Southern position on the bill.206 The meeting 
confirmed Roosevelt’s personal approval of the anti-lynching bill, however, they too failed to 
gain the President’s public support. Therefore, White tried to reach FDR through journalists 
like Max Stern, who asked the President questions at a press conference in late May. 
Roosevelt responded again with mere hopes for a vote on the anti-lynching bill, for he 
indeed believed that the bill would come to pass if it was voted upon.207   
 In June, however, White knew the Senate was close to adjourning. Therefore, on June 
14th, he attempted one more time to convince Roosevelt by writing him another letter: 
 Today’s newspapers report that a desperate effort is being made by Congress to 
 adjourn on Saturday, June 16, or June 23. Adjournment of Congress without action 
 on S.1978, The Costigan-Wagner Anti-Lynching Bill, which was introduced in the 
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 House of representatives by Congressman Thomas F. Ford of California, will 
 unquestionably, according to all present indications, result in recrudescence of mob 
 violence. Such violence has been held in check by fear of federal legislation. The 
 impending adjournment of Congress is obviously encouraging lynchers to begin their 
 deadly work again.208 
He ended his letter by asking the President again to insist upon a vote of the bill before the 
adjournment of Congress. He warned him that: 
 We cannot permit two certain senators who come from states with lynching records 
 worse than those of almost any other state, who are blocking a vote on the bill, to 
 succeed in their sinister efforts. Should they succeed every person in official positions 
 who has not done his utmost at least to secure a vote on the bill will, in a measure, 
 be responsible for each lynching which occurs between adjournment of Congress and 
 its reconvening. We urge again upon you as President that you exercise the utmost 
 efforts to secure a vote on and passage of the anti-lynching bill.209  
In other words, Walter White would not just blame the Southern senators who blocked the 
bill, if it failed to pass, he would accuse the White House and the President himself as well. 
 Still, the President remained silent, and a few days later it was announced that the 
bill would not come to a vote before the adjournment of the Senate. This was a major 
setback for its supporters, but White was not going to throw in the towel just yet. During the 
summer he prepared the reintroduction of the anti-lynching bill.210 For this purpose, he met 
frequently with both Costigan and Wagner to discuss different strategies. He also seized 
every opportunity he got, to spread the word and gain support for his campaign against 
violence. Among other things, the NAACP organized plenty of benefits, picnics, and other 
sort of entertainments in order to achieve this.211       
 Throughout the summer, the number of lynchings had increased, just like White had 
predicted. However, it was not until the lynching of Claude Neal in October 1934, that the 
debate about federal legislation came up again. Thus, when the attorney general announced 
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that there would be a national crime conference in December, the question arose why 
lynchings were not placed on the agenda of the event. White and the NAACP were not 
pleased at all. Even though the President had made a key-note speech in which he 
denounced lynchings as ‘one of the major crimes confronting this country,’212 the attorney 
general ignored the requests from the association to include lynchings on the agendum. 
Therefore, the District of Columbia branch of the NAACP started to picket.213 They were 
almost immediately arrested and charged with violating the District of Columbia sign law and 
parading without a permit. However, that would not stop them. As White recalled in an 
article in The Crisis, the official publication of the association: 
  The District of Columbia branch of the N.A.A.C.P. decided to resume the picketing. 
 On the last day of the conference, December 13, just before the morning session 
 adjourned, about sixty pickets suddenly appeared on the sidewalk in front of the 
 convention hall, and silently took up pre-arranged station about ten feet apart, 
 stretching all the way from the entrance of the hall about three squares along the 
 street the delegates had to use in leaving the conference. To avoid the sign law which 
 prohibited signs twelve inches or over, the pickets carried signs across their breasts 
 eleven inches wide. Ropes were looped around their necks to symbolize lynching. To 
 avoid the charge of parading, each picket remained silent and stationary. The police 
 were taken completely by surprise.214 
This is just one example of the lengths White and the NAACP were willing to go to in order to 
enable the enactment of federal anti-lynching legislation.     
 A few months later, the Costigan-Wagner bill was up for consideration in the Senate 
again and another filibuster had started. The support of the White House was necessary now 
more than ever. Thus, White continued to write letters to Roosevelt. He emphasized that the 
great majority of the senators had indicated their intention to vote in favor of the bill and 
only twenty of them were “irreconcilably opposed”.215 He was convinced that ‘only word 
from [the President] to the Senate or the country at large will break the filibuster and insure 
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a vote on [the] bill.’216 When Roosevelt still refused to speak out in favor of the bill, White 
sought for more support to persuade the President. He drew up a petition, which circulated 
throughout the country. It read: ‘Please Sign and Circulate this Anti-Lynching Petition to 
President Roosevelt […] The States will not stop lynching. A Federal law is necessary. Return 
to Walter White.’217 Still, his efforts were in vain. White remained unable to obtain an 
appointment with Roosevelt to discuss the seriousness of the situation and eventually the 
filibusterers won the battle again.        
 During the summer of 1935, the number of lynchings increased once more and even 
though the Costigan-Wagner bill was officially dead, White continued to write to the 
President about his disappointment and the need for federal legislation. In July he stated: 
 A man alleged to be insane was put to death in the state of Senator Josiah W. Bailey, 
 one of the most vociferous leaders of the filibuster against the Costigan-Wagner anti-
 lynching bill. This is the fifth lynching since the filibusters succeeded in sidetracking 
 [the] anti-lynching bill. Should Congress adjourn without acting against lynching it is 
 probable and almost certain that human beings now alive will fall victims to mobs. 
 The situation necessitates your urging upon Congress that it act without delay to pass 
 Costigan-Wagner bill. Our country cannot with good grace denounce barbarism in 
 Nazi Germany as long as these mob outrages disgrace America.218 
A month later, a few days before the planned adjournment of the Senate, White wrote 
another letter imploring Roosevelt to speak out. He wrote the message after the sixth 
lynching (in just a few months’ time) had taken place.219      
 However, the President’s reply remained unchanged and he did not step in. It was 
not until January 1936 until the issue came up again. White knew his chances of receiving 
strong support of the White House had increased, since Roosevelt would be up for re-
election and undoubtedly needed to attract the support of black voters.220 Therefore, White 
tried again to gain his support. This time, Roosevelt met him halfway by proposing a Senate 
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investigation of lawlessness which included lynchings. Moreover, he proposed a meeting 
between White and the attorney general to discuss new legislation to guard the courts 
against interference from angry mobs. Even though his efforts showed the willingness of the 
President to stand up against lynchings, his actions would not accomplish the punishment of 
lynchings themselves. Thus, the NAACP was not satisfied.221     
 In the meantime, the Association tried to gain support for another anti-lynching bill. 
However, their efforts to introduce a new bill had not yet been fruitful. The Van Nuys 
resolution was not as well received as its predecessor. Therefore, White continued to get in 
contact with FDR. However, he was already struggling to get in contact with a White House 
official, let alone with the President. Neither could he reach Senator Byrnes, who was 
believed to be Roosevelt’s personal spokesman on the floor of the Senate.222 Therefore, 
White told the President that: ‘there is widespread speculation as to whether or not his 
[Byrnes] hostility to the Van Nuys resolution is due to personal reasons or because he is 
acting under instructions. May I add personal that I am loathe to believe the latter?’223 
 During the months of March and April, the Van Nuys resolution was still not up for a 
vote. The senators from the Deep South were utterly against the measure and were blocking 
it at all costs.224 When the Senate was yet again close to adjourning without discussing the 
pending bill, White urged the President to at least tell senator Byrnes to support the 
measure. 
 Several prominent democratic senators who state unequivocally that there is no 
 hope for action on Senate Resolution two eleven introduced by Senator Van Nuys to 
 investigate lynchings, unless you personally request Senator Byrnes to call 
 immediately a meeting of [the] audit and control committee to report out [the] 
 resolution so that the Senate may vote on it before adjourning. Every senator with 
 whom I have talked state that since Senator Byrnes is [the] senator closest to you and 
 is one who will unhesitatingly do what you wish, they are assuming that his inaction 
 is due to Senator Byrnes believing you do not particularly wish the resolution to pass. 
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 My statement, that you assured me last January second you favored the passage of 
 at least a resolution to investigate facts, has been of no avail. In view of the recently 
 revealed facts that Black legion has used lynchings to recruit members in Michigan 
 and other states and further fact that lynchings are growing in number and ferocity, 
 may I most urgently appeal to you to use your utmost influence with Senator Byrnes 
 and other senators to pass before the adjournment the Van Nuys resolution.225 
Unfortunately, the Senate did adjourn before the consideration of the Van Nuys bill and it 
was not taken up again.          
 A year later, however, the NAACP was sponsoring another anti-lynching bill, this time 
named after the Democratic Senator Joseph A. Gavagan. When it became apparent that this 
bill would receive the same treatment by the Southern opposition as its predecessors, White 
wrote a petition to the majority of senators. He expressed his dismay with the rumors that 
Congress would only consider certain bills before its adjournment and ignore the anti-
lynching bill.226 He simply did not understand why the Gavagan bill was not up for 
consideration, especially since another lynching had occurred in Florida a few days before. It 
would have been the perfect time for a vote, since many senators opposing the bill were up 
for reelections. Therefore, the possibility for a filibuster was slim.227    
 White made the following statement: 
We fully appreciate and sympathize with the desire of many members of Congress
 to get away from the oppressive heat of Washington, but we are equally concerned 
 with the fact that American citizens now alive may conceivably be burned alive at
 the stake or by blow torches or otherwise killed by lawless mobs before the next 
 session of Congress convened.228  
White wrote a similar message to Roosevelt, stating that all they needed was one strong 
word from him in order to assure the passage of the Gavagan bill. He asked him ‘on behalf of 
all American citizens now alive who may be lynched before the next session of Congress 
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convenes’229 to utter such a word.         
 Still, Congress adjourned before the bill had a chance to reach the floor. In the next 
couple of months, White continued to try and gain support for federal anti-lynching 
legislation. The NAACP made reports and studied among other things the public opinion of 
the subject. They found that many people throughout the country (even in the Southern 
states) were open to the idea of federal legislation. Therefore, White did not hesitate to 
send the results of their studies to the President. He hoped that Roosevelt would no longer 
fear the reaction of Southern senators and feel free to support federal legislation against 
lynchings.230 FDR, however, refused to anger the Southern bloc in congress. He still needed 
their support for other pressing matters, like his New Deal proposals.    
 In January 1938, the Gavagan bill was up for a vote in the Senate again. 
Unfortunately, history repeated itself again and its opponents started to filibuster against it. 
White and Joel Spingarn, the president of the NAACP, were urging the President to speak out 
and pressure the Senate to break the filibuster. They argued that the Republicans were using 
this issue against his administration. On the one hand they favored the principle of unlimited 
senatorial debate, which enabled the filibuster, while on the other hand they were criticizing 
the President for not intervening in favor of the bill. While this bill failed to pass as well, 
White was able to arrange another meeting with Roosevelt. This time he brought together 
not only members of the NAACP, but also members of the National Negro Congress and 
other associations who kept pressuring Roosevelt for action against lynchings. This move 
resulted in a fruitful meeting. The President proposed federal investigations of lynchings. 
While this was mainly a vain promise, he did show his goodwill by appointing African 
Americans to all kind of leadership positions and by instituting a Fair Employment Practices 
policy for government hiring.231         
 Thus, it is safe to conclude that even though White was unable to convince the 
President to speak out in favor of federal anti-lynching legislation, he did achieve other 
things, which may have been even more important and in part led to the consolidation of 
the civil right movements in the years to come. By the end of the decade, Walter White had 
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unprecedented access to the White House through Eleanor Roosevelt and he had built up a 
close relation with the President that would last for the rest of their lives.232 Furthermore, 
while Roosevelt never publicly supported any anti-lynching bill, he did speak out against the 
horror of lynching and he acknowledged the anti-lynching campaign’s significance for the 
black community.233 In the end, the hard work of the NAACP’s executive secretary had 
definitely not been in vain.  
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Chapter 4: Mary McLeod Bethune, The NYA and the Anti-lynching Crusade 
While Walter White was a prominent figure in the anti-lynching debate and a vigorous 
activist who fought for the rights of African Americans, he was not alone in the fight for 
equality. As discussed in the previous chapters, there were many people who tried to 
persuade President Roosevelt to speak out in favor of anti-lynching legislation and to 
improve the lives of blacks in general. One particular person stands out: Dr. Mary McLeod 
Bethune. While they often worked together and towards similar goals, White and Bethune 
were quite different. Unlike White, Mrs. Bethune was not just perceived as an activist. 
Instead, she worked as a government official and was, therefore, able to come closer to the 
President than most people at that time with a similar racial background. These 
dissimilarities make for an interesting case study. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the 
following questions: What was Mary McLeod Bethune’s role in the anti-lynching debate? 
What did she achieve and to what extent was she able to convince the President to support 
a federal bill against lynchings?        
 She was born in 1875 near Mayesville, South Carolina, as the fifteenth of seventeen 
children. She was the only daughter who was able to get an education through scholarships. 
She graduated from Scotia Seminary and was able to attend Moody Bible Institute in 
Chicago.234 Afterwards, she returned back south and became a teacher. She started teaching 
in Georgia, but soon moved to Florida to pursue her dream of educating young African 
American women.235 In 1904, she started off with near to nothing but managed to establish 
the Daytona Educational and Industrial Training school in a rented cabin to teach a handful 
of girls.236 However, soon she was able to expand and in 1924 the school merged with the 
Cookman Institute of Jacksonville.237       
 Nowadays, Bethune is well remembered as the co-founder of the Bethune-Cookman 
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college. In 1926, The New York Times called her the ‘Booker T. Washington of her sex.’238 
They wrote an article about her stating the following: 
 A young negro woman who had saved $1.50 parted from her sixteen brothers and 
 sisters in South Carolina twenty-two years ago and founded a college in a rented 
 shack at Daytona Beach, Fla. The campus and buildings are now worth nearly 
 $1.000.0000 and the founder Mrs. Mary McLeod Bethune […] came to New York 
 yesterday with the conviction, after a score of years of teaching experience among 
 negroes and whites, that “Christian education will wipe out practically all race 
 difficulties in the South.” […] “When ignorant negroes and ignorant whites live in the 
 same district, the conditions are bad,” said Mrs. Bethune. “The situation is always 
 improved when both races are better educated; a more sympathetic strain never falls 
 to be struck between progressive trained negroes and progressive trained white 
 people.”239  
While this in itself is already quite impressive, these were not her only 
accomplishments. During her career as a teacher, she joined several political groups and 
movements. In 1912, for instance, she became part of the Equal Suffrage League, an 
organization which was dedicated to voting rights for everyone.240 In 1920, she was elected 
to the executive board of the National Urban League and a few years later, she became the 
president of the National Association of Colored Women. As a result, many politicians began 
to recognize Bethune’s influence and tried to involve her in their civil rights and race relation 
efforts.241 Through these movements she was able to form alliances with multiple influential 
people, among others was Eleanor Roosevelt. Just like White, Bethune developed a 
friendship with the future First Lady. The two women met early in the 1920s during a 
luncheon which was held by FDR’s mother. Not only was Bethune the only African American 
there, she was also seated as the guest of honor.242     
 Bethune was no stranger to being the only black person in the room. She had 
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attended multiple meetings and conferences where most of the people attending were 
white. This did not go unnoticed. The New York Times featured an article which applauded 
her: 
When a Negro daughter of slave parents can stand before an audience of persons 
 born and reared in the South, talk frankly of such traditionally explosive topics as 
 social equality and social justice, win frequent applause and afterward have her 
 hands clasped by persons who have never before made that particular gesture of 
 friendship toward one of her race, it is evidence not only that the speaker is 
 persuasive, but more than that – that the South is assuming a new attitude toward 
 the Negro. Mary McLeod Bethune [is] the mirror in which this new attitude was 
 reflected.243 
She was a respected woman, even in the white community.     
 Therefore, it came as no surprise that, in 1935, she was granted the Spingarn Medal, 
which is awarded annually by the NAACP ‘for the highest or noblest achievement by an 
American Negro during the preceding year or years.’244 The committee behind the Medal 
explained why Bethune had won: ‘In the face of the almost insuperable difficulties she has, 
almost singlehandedly, established and built up Bethune-Cookman College […] Both the 
institution’s and Mrs. Bethune’s influence have been nation-wide.’245 The Crisis also 
acknowledged her and her work by putting her on the cover of the July issue. In their article 
they stated that: 
Mrs. Bethune was a leading spirit in establishing a Home for Delinquent Girls at  
 Ocala, Florida, while president of the State Association of Colored Women. She has 
 also served with distinction as president of the Southeastern Federation of Women’s 
 Clubs, two terms as president of the National Association of Colored Women, 
 president of the National Association of Teachers in Colored Schools, and president 
 of the Florida State Teachers Association. She is also a member and director of the 
 Commission on Interracial Cooperation, a member of the National Council of Women 
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 of America, of the international Council of the Women of the World, of the 
 international Council of the Women of the Darker Races, and of the National 
 Education Association. Through her many activities in the fields of education, social 
 service and interracial work, she has created a new appreciation of the finest Negro 
 womanhood in America and made a tremendous contribution to the cause of the 
 Negro advancement.246  
Bethune was the second woman to win the medal and two years later, the award was won 
by no other than Walter White.247        
 During the 1930s, Bethune achieved even more. In 1930 she was appointed by 
President Herbert Hoover to the White House Conference on Child Health and in 1935 she 
founded the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW), an organization ‘to advance 
opportunities and the quality of life for African American women, their families and 
communities.’248 However, most importantly, in that same year, she not only served as 
President Roosevelt’s special advisor on minority affairs, but she became the director of the 
Division of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration (NYA) as well. The latter was 
especially meaningful since she became the first African American woman to head a federal 
agency.249            
 That is how Bethune became part of Roosevelt’s so-called “Black Cabinet”. While 
various presidents before him had already relied on informal black advisors, almost no 
African Americans had been visible in the White House until Roosevelt created this unofficial 
cabinet to advise him on issues concerning the black community.250  
[They] were brought into the New Deal set-up by President Roosevelt so that he 
 would always be in position to obtain first-hand information regarding the Negro 
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 population, his needs and ambitions; and so that his best interests could be served in 
 the same degree that the rest of the citizenry is served.251 
Therefore, it was a major step forward. The Cabinet consisted of multiple African American 
government officials who would advise the President on “Negro Affairs”.252 Their 
appointment was prominently displayed in many newspapers and especially African 
Americans were made aware of their work: ‘Every colored person should know them and the 
respective departments with which they are identified because what they say and do vitally 
impact our interests.’253          
 One of these interests, of course, was the equal protection of the law. Therefore, the 
officials of the Black Cabinet were also involved with the anti-lynching debate. Bethune did 
not just work together with the NAACP, but with multiple other associations as well. Among 
these groups were the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching 
(ASWPL) and the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC). She, herself, was part of the 
Women’s Committee of the CIC.254 In 1935, Bethune joined a meeting and asked the women 
of both organizations to support the Costigan-Wagner bill. She stated the following: 
 We think one of the most significant and outstanding things that have been done 
 toward our redemption, for the thing we have been moving toward, has been the 
 work of this group of  Southern women who have made this very fine bold and 
 Christian declaration to the world as to their stand in regard to the situation. […] If 
 we are ever to be free […] the step must be taken by Southern people. Southern 
 women, you can do more with 24.000 signatures to bring about that freedom for the 
 Negro race than a million from the North.255 
While it was not enough to ensure the enactment of the bill, she did make a powerful 
statement.          
 Bethune believed that by educating the black as well as the white population racism 
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as well as lynchings would decline. Therefore, she organized multiple meetings and 
conferences. In 1937, for instance, the National Youth Administration sponsored the 
National Conference on Problems of the Negro and Negro Youth and Bethune presided as its 
chairman.256 More than seventy African American leaders from the South, East and Mid-
West of the United States came together to discuss reforms like ‘the destruction of racial 
barriers to employment, more adequate medical, educational, and recreational facilities; 
free and effective use of the ballot, and amelioration of the evils of the farm tenancy system; 
and a federal anti-lynching bill.’257        
 The NYA had invited multiple government officials to speak on the platform. Among 
others were Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, Daniel A. Roper, Secretary of 
Commerce, Walter White, who was appointed as the chairman of the committee on Security 
of Life and Equal Protection under the Law, and Eleanor Roosevelt.258 As mentioned before, 
Bethune and the First Lady were friends and worked together on multiple occasions. Mrs. 
Roosevelt was a firm supporter of the anti-lynching crusade as well. In 1939, she attended 
another NYA Conference on Negro Problems in Washington to speak out against 
lynchings.259 She was introduced by Bethune, who, at that point was known to some as ‘The 
First Lady of the Negro race’.260 Therefore, many newspapers stated that ‘A first Lady 
introduced the First Lady’.261 The Nashville Defender described the situation as followed:  
 The First Lady of the land showed her sincere interest in the race, and its problems by 
 her willingness to assist in suggestions and plans for its betterment. This was 
 something practically unheard of in the “land of the free and home of the brave.” […] 
 Mrs. Roosevelt had stated that all should feel free to ask questions, and she would 
 answer equally as frankly. She said that she favors not only enactment, but counsels 
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 swift enactment of the federal anti-lynching law, and proposed that its provinces be 
 applied to all forms of mob violence.262  
However, she also questioned whether such a bill could actually stop the lynchings. Still, she 
preferred to see the bill pass because ‘it puts us, as a whole, against something which we 
should all be against. This law should be passed as soon as possible,’263 because ‘it is harmful 
everywhere for minorities to remain silent when minorities do not enjoy all the rights of a 
democracy.’264 Overall, the two women created an atmosphere where the conversation was 
transformed into ‘a round-table pow wow.’265      
 The First Lady made it abundantly clear that she spoke for herself and not for the 
Administration or the President.266 Therefore, Bethune gained the support of a well-known 
public figure, but not that of Roosevelt himself. She, however, did not just organize 
conferences, but wrote letters to multiple influential people about lynchings as well. For 
instance, in 1939, after the lynchings of Lee Snell in Florida Bethune wrote a strong letter to 
Governor Fred Cone after a Florida jury had set the brothers Blackwelder free despite the 
fact that they were positively identified as the murderers of Mr. Snell.267 She was asked by 
another Daytona Beach resident, T. E. Fitzgerald to become involved with the situation. He 
wrote her: ‘I trust that you, because of your high position as a negro leader, will offset as 
best as you can the iniquitous report. My only interest is that of fair play and the protection 
of the city in which your wonderful school is located.’268 Thus, Bethune took up the case of 
Lee Snell and wrote the following to the governor: 
 On behalf of the Negroes of Daytona Beach, Volusia County, Florida, I am writing to 
 inform you that the results of the trial […] of the cold-blooded murder of Lee Snell, 
 have almost paralyzed us. We appeal to you, as Governor of Florida, for some 
 intervention, some investigation, some consideration, that justice may be done. With 
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 such an unjust handling of a case of murder, there is no safety for any Negro citizen in 
 this state. We feel that this is not in accord with your desire as Governor of the State. 
 Our hearts are crushed and we earnestly solicit your consideration. Some word of 
 assurance from you is greatly needed by any people in Daytona Beach. We are law-
 abiding citizens and have pleasured up to Community requirements, to state and 
 national laws. Governor Cone, what have you to say about this cold-blooded murder 
 of Lee Snell?269   
She did not stop there. She wrote letters to the editors of white newspapers 
proclaiming that Snell was a law-abiding citizen and a veteran who fought vigorously for his 
country. She also expressed her feelings about this lynching to the citizens of Volusia County: 
‘the eyes of America and the world are turned this way taking note of your standard of 
justice. In turn for our loyalty and unfailing patriotism, what are you willing to do for us?’270 
Unfortunately, she did not achieve her goal of acquiring justice for Snell, however, Bethune 
did show her compassion for the people in Florida and her determination to end 
lynchings.271           
 As a strong anti-lynching spokesperson and as the informal advisor of Roosevelt, 
Bethune, of course, brought up the issue of lynchings with the President as well. However, as 
the chairman of the NYA she was, as a government official, primarily focused on educational 
reforms for African Americans. Still, she did write letters to Roosevelt in order to convince 
him to speak out on the matter. In 1940, for instance, she wrote: 
The National Council of Negro Women of the United States, Inc. representing five 
 million women, would appreciate some public utterance from you on the Anti-
 Lynching Bill. We have watched with interest your great humanitarian program and 
 we are sure that you are vitally interested in all minority groups. Despite this 
 assurance, we feel that since there are interests which are opposed to the passing of 
 this very necessary piece of legislation, that you, as president of the United States, 
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 could do the Negro group a service that would never be forgotten, if some word 
 could be said on this matter.272 
This letter was less straight forward than the one she had send to governor Cone and it was 
not nearly as direct as the letters White had send to the President. Still, she did show her 
support for the anti-lynching crusade once again.     
 White and Bethune also worked together on multiple occasions in order to endorse a 
federal anti-lynching bill. They remained in touch throughout the 1930s and their friendship 
grew. At first, they were merely acquaintances who wrote to each other to gain support. 
However, throughout the years their letters became more friendly and personal. For 
instance, in 1936 their conversations started with “Dear Mr. White” or “My Dear Mrs. 
Bethune” and they ended with “Kind Regards”.273 However, five years later, they addressed 
each other as “Mary” and “Walter” and ended their letters with “lots of love”.274 This came 
as no surprise, because they started to work together quite frequently since Bethune had 
become a government official and, therefore, was a strong ally in the fight against lynchings. 
 Bethune organized multiple conferences where White would speak, and vice versa. In 
1941, she even wrote him to ask for the inclusion of a speaker of the NYA at the Third 
Annual Student Conference which the NAACP was organizing: 
I think, Walter, that there is no organization now that is making a more challenging 
 contribution to the youth of America than the NYA. Negro youth are being benefitted 
 by our  program and I think it is important that your organization should think in 
 terms of a national representative at such an important conference for youth. I just 
 knew how freely I could write you on this. It is just like thinking aloud. I do want to 
 see you as soon as possible. Our paths have not crossed enough this year. I am 
 hoping that you are going to come here early enough during the conference of the 
 National Council of Negro Women to take in some of our activities.275  
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Thus, he would do something for her and she would return the favor. She concluded her 
letter with the following statement: ‘I am speaking for the NAACP in Richmond next Sunday 
afternoon. There will be not much speaking, Walter but my presence will be a vote of 
confidence in the grand work that the NAACP is doing.’276 The NAACP knew that they could 
count on Bethune. So, when they needed money for their anti-lynching campaign, they knew 
who to turn to for help. The Association hoped to sell 200.000 buttons for ten cents each 
and wrote, among others, to the Bethune-Cookman college and to the NYA chairman 
herself.277 To show her support of the anti-lynching campaign once more, Bethune ordered 
100 buttons and sold them at the college.278       
 In conclusion, it cannot be denied that Mary McLeod Bethune was an active anti-
lynching advocate who did a lot for the fight against lynchings. However, even though she 
was a government official and an unofficial advisor to President Roosevelt, she did not 
pursue his support for the anti-lynching bills that were pending in congress, as much as 
White did. As a public governmental figure, she was, just like Roosevelt, forced to deal with a 
strong Southern political block. Another reason was the fact that the success of the NYA 
programs was largely depended of the financial sponsorship of community civic groups. 
Thus, the NYA had to remain focused on local community participation and control.279 Still, 
because of the forcefulness in her private relationships with both white and black 
administrators, activists and other politicians, she is remembered as a prominent figure in 
the anti-lynching debate. 
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Conclusion 
While the 1930s in the United States have become inextricably linked to the Great 
Depression, the economic crisis was not the only issue that had to be dealt with. During 
these years, the debate about federal anti-lynching legislation came up again. In the decade 
before, the number of lynchings had drastically declined. However, as a result of the crisis 
they started to occur more frequently and could no longer be ignored.280 Racism and 
discrimination towards African Americans had persisted throughout the centuries and 
lynchings were one of their most ruthless manifestations.281 Therefore, the debate was 
fueled with prejudices and ideas of white-supremacy.       
 While the discussion about anti-lynching legislation received national attention and 
many Americans were against the horrors, the federal government never enacted a law to 
end lynchings or punish mob violence. The majority of Southern senators were directly 
responsible for the failure of the bills, however, their persistence in filibustering is not the 
only reason federal anti-lynching legislation was not enacted.282 The proponents of the bills 
failed in all three instances to stand their ground and it can be argued that they gave in too 
easily. Still, the fault does not just lie with the legislative branch of government.  
 This thesis primarily focused on the reaction of the executive branch to anti-lynching 
legislation. What was President Roosevelt’s role in the debate and what did he do against 
lynchings? The main question this thesis sought to answer, however, involved the people 
who influenced his decisions: “How did Walter White and Mary McLeod Bethune differ in 
their attempts to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt to endorse anti-lynching legislation in the 
1930s and to what extent were they successful?”       
 During his presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt was frequently asked to step in and 
express his support for federal anti-lynching legislation. Despite these numerous attempts, 
he never publicly spoke out in favor of any specific bill. While Roosevelt had nothing against 
the bills personally, he did not want to harm his relationships with the Southerners in 
Congress.283 These congressmen had the power to block all NRA related bills if they wanted 
to. Therefore, the President chose to prioritize his New Deal agenda. This, however, did not 
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mean Roosevelt was not involved with the debate at all. Throughout the years he had had 
multiple meetings with proponents of the anti-lynching bills. He spoke with senators like E. 
P. Costigan and R. F. Wagner and he sent them papers (of the record) to support their 
cause.284            
 At the beginning of the decade, Roosevelt was not as involved with the anti-lynching 
debate. Over the years, one man in particular made him change his mind: Walter White. 
Through his frequent contact with Eleanor Roosevelt, White was able to gain access to the 
White House.285 The First Lady was known for her interest in ‘progressive legislation for the 
welfare of women and children, the improvement of the condition of workers, for the 
promotion of education and peace and the assurance of civil rights to all citizens regardless 
of race.’286 Therefore, it came as no surprise that she was a supporter of anti-lynching 
legislation and because of her assistance White was able to set up multiple meetings with 
the President.287         
 During these meetings, they extensively discussed federal anti-lynching legislation 
and according to White’s autobiography, he was indeed able to convince the President of its 
importance.288 This remained a moral victory, since Roosevelt was still unwilling to speak out 
in favor of an anti-lynching bill. Fortunately, White was not alone in his struggle to gain the 
President’s support. Among the hundreds of other people who wrote to Roosevelt about 
these matters was Mary McLeod Bethune. She stood out, not only because she was an anti-
lynching activist and the president of multiple organizations (like the National Association of 
Colored Women), but also because she became the unofficial leader of Roosevelt’s Black 
Cabinet and the director of the Division of Negro Affairs of the NYA.289   
 While both White and Bethune fought to enable the enactment of federal anti-
lynching legislation, they did not always follow the same path. As a NAACP activist, White 
was actively involved with the drafting of the bills and he remained a loyal lobbyist in 
Congress. Bethune, on the other hand, was a government official and worked from within 
the political and governmental system. While the federal anti-lynching debate received the 
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undivided attention of White and the NAACP, Bethune also focused on other matters. As the 
head of the NYA and as an educator herself, she had to focus on the education of African 
Americans as well. She was a spokesperson for the general improvement of the lives of the 
black community.290           
 Still, both White and Bethune focused on the same goals and worked together on 
multiple occasions. They organized conferences and spoke at meetings to spread the word 
about the pending bills. However, their approach towards President Roosevelt was quite 
different. First of all, White had written far more letters to the President about this 
particular subject then Bethune. One of the reasons for White’s continuous efforts to 
contact Roosevelt was the fact that the NAACP had sponsored the Costigan-Wagner and 
Gavagan bills. Therefore, White was inextricably linked to the development of the bills. He 
believed that only the support of the President could rescue them from the filibusters in the 
Senate.291 Bethune did not have to write as much, since she was a government official and 
an advisor of the President.292 Therefore, she was able to contact Roosevelt more easily. 
Still, as the director of the Division of Negro Affairs of the NYA she could not afford to write 
only about anti-lynching legislation.       
 Another difference between them was the manner in which they addressed the 
President. White was more direct in his letters and expressed his disappointment extensively 
when Roosevelt refused to speak out in favor of an anti-lynching bill. He would not mince his 
words. Bethune on the other hand was far more polite.293 As an African American 
government official she would not have wanted to harm her connection with the President. 
Especially, because Roosevelt had appointed her as director of the NYA himself. White, on 
the other hand, continuously stressed the dire necessity of Roosevelt’s support, especially 
when he feared a bill would not pass because of a filibuster.294 As executive secretary of the 
NAACP, he had less to lose.          
 Still, in the end both of them were vigorous anti-lynching crusaders in their own way. 
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In the 1930s, anti-lynching legislation was White’s main concern. However, Bethune focused 
on various problems concerning the African American community. She might have been 
more restricted in some ways, but she still remained a loyal supporter of federal legislation 
and contributed greatly to the anti-lynching debate.      
 In the end, Roosevelt was deeply influenced by both White and Bethune. At the 
beginning of his presidency, he was not involved with the anti-lynching debate at all. It was 
not until his meetings with White that the President became convinced of the 
constitutionality and need of the proposed bills.295 By 1938, when the Wagner-Van Nuys bill 
was up for consideration in Congress, Roosevelt even stated that if the bill failed to pass, the 
discussion about federal legislation should not end there. He proposed that either the 
legislative or executive branch would have to come up with a permanent machinery to 
investigate lynchings.296 A few years later, in 1942, he finally spoke in favor of anti-lynching 
legislation and ordered federal investigation of all lynchings. While this was indeed a step in 
the right direction, it came a little too late for the anti-lynching debate since after 1940 no 
major bill was proposed and the number of lynchings had declined again.297  
 Still, it did show the willingness of the President and the White House to become 
involved with matters surrounding racism and discrimination. It can even be argued that this 
was a first step towards civil rights. While this President prioritized New Deal legislation in 
favor of anti-lynching legislation, he was not insensitive to the subject. In fact, because of 
people like White and Bethune, he became more involved with the matter and in the end 
even spoke out in favor of anti-lynching legislation. Therefore, both Walter White and Mary 
McLeod Bethune’s struggle to gain Roosevelt’s support was not in vain.   
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